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A Normative Theory of Disagreement1 
Graham Bex-Priestley and Yonatan Shemmer2  
 
ABSTRACT: Expressivists have trouble accounting for disagreement. If ethical or other 
normative judgments are desire-like rather than belief-like, it is puzzling why we think 
people often disagree in those domains. While previous expressivists have proposed only 
straightforwardly descriptive conditions under which disagreement occurs, we argue 
that disagreement itself should be understood normatively: two or more people disagree 
just in case their diverging attitudes imply, given a common project of theirs, that at 
least one of them has reason to change their mind. 
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For realists about a given domain, the phenomenon of disagreement seems easy to 
account for Ȯ someone asserting p disagrees with someone asserting q if and only if p 
and q cannot be simultaneously true (in the sense of accurately representing the 
world). Since expressivists believe some declarative sentences express non-
representational attitudes like approvals or plans, they require a more nuanced 
account of disagreement. 
We present a theory of disagreement according to which ascriptions of 
disagreement are partly normative. Existing expressivist theories of disagreement 
such as those offered by Stevenson, Blackburn, Gibbard and Ridge, give only 
descriptive conditions which, they maintain, are sufficient to identify disagreement. On 
the account we argue for, the claim that people disagree involves the normative claim 
that at least one party has reason to reconsider their view in light of their common 
project. If normative anti-realism is true and our arguments are sound, it means there 
                                                          
1 We would like to thank Luca Barlassina, Lewis Brooks, Alex Duval, David Enoch, Paul Faulkner, 
Jimmy Lenman, Hallvard Lillehammer, Mike Martin, Veronique Munoz-Darde, Joseph Raz, Daniel 
Viehoff and our two anonymous reviewers, as well as audiences at the annual conference of the Israel 
Philosophical Association, Sheffield University and the workshop sȱȁȱǰȱȱȱȱ
the EthȂȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ. 
2 Authors are listed in ascending order of degree of belief in the central thesis (with apologies to Clark 
and Chalmers). 
2 
 
is no robust fact of the matter about whether two people disagree with one another. 
We believe our theory offers the best expressivist account of disagreement. However, 
in this paper we merely aim to highlight its advantages and to convince the reader to 
consider it as an interesting new candidate for an expressivist theory of disagreement.3  
 
1. Desiderata for a Theory of Disagreement 
Fundamental normative disagreements are normative disagreements that persist 
despite agreement on all the relevant non-normative facts. A theory of disagreement 
that tries to capture the phenomenon of fundamental normative disagreement ought 
to satisfy the following desiderata: 
x It describes the phenomenon of normative disagreement in such a way that 
justifies our classifying it as a species of the genus ȁdisagreementȂ. The 
essential features that constitute normative disagreement must be shared by 
cases of theoretical disagreement. Call this feature 'unity'. 
x It matches our pre-theoretical intuitions. That is, it must classify cases we 
pre-theoretically think of as cases of disagreement as cases of disagreement, 
and cases we pre-theoretically think of as cases in which no disagreement 
occurs as cases of non-ǯȱȱȱȱȁȂ. 
x It explains the possibility of the persistence of normative disagreement 
despite agreement on all non-normative facts. Call this feature 'persistence'. 
Cognitivists typically explain normative disagreement as a particular case of 
descriptive disagreement. Persons who normatively disagree, cognitivists assert, 
disagree in virtue of having beliefs with incompatible contents: they disagree because 
they describe the world (of reasons) in incompatible ways. 
Expressivists cannot subscribe to this cognitivist analysis because, on their 
view, normative judgments are not descriptive. Instead, expressivists appeal to the 
notion of conflict between non-cognitive attitudes such as desires, intentions or plans. 
Their accounts are thus well placed to satisfy persistence, since conflicts between non-
cognitive attitudes are taken to be independent of agreements in beliefs. On the other 
hand, they thereby expose themselves to the charge of failing to meet the requirement 
for unity because the concept of conflict upon which they rely is different from the 
concept of conflict employed in the analysis of descriptive disagreement. 
Independently expressivists are often accused of failing the requirement for match. 
                                                          
3 We also think that our theory is an interesting candidate for a cognitivist theory of disagreement. 
Arguing for that claim is not part of our current task. 
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Before we critically assess existing expressivist accounts, here is a brief 
overview of our own theory. Our account aims to cover disagreement both in attitudes 
that play a role in descriptive judgments and in attitudes that play a role in normative 
judgments. The account is grounded in two basic thoughts. First, that there is no 
robust fact of the matter about whether or not two given people disagree, and second, 
that disagreement entails reasons for one of the parties to change their mind. It is 
designed to satisfy the three desiderata mentioned above. Our main claim is this: A 
and B disagree if and only if they have different attitudes and, given a shared project of theirs, 
this implies at least one of them has reason to change his/her attitude. 
 In the following three sections we argue that accounts given by Charles 
Stevenson, Allan Gibbard and Michael Ridge are problematic. We then present our 
normative theory of disagreement as an interesting alternative which overcomes the 
problems of the existing accounts. 
 
2. Disagreement in Preference 
Ȃȱ ǻŗşŚŚǼȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ
expressivists. Imagine two people discussing where to go for dinner together. One 
person is for Chinese food, but the other wants Indian. This clash is viewed by 
Stevenson as a disagreement about where to dine. Since we may suppose the 
disputants agree about what food each restaurant serves, the prices, the efficiency of 
service and all other relevant properties, Stevenson claims the ȱȁsprings 
more from divergent preferences than from divergent beliefs, and will end when they 
ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȂ (Stevenson 1944: 3). On a Stevensonian account, there 
are therefore two ways for people to disagree. Conflicting beliefs cannot be 
simultaneously true; conflicting desires cannot be simultaneously satisfied. Blackburn 
subscribes to a Stevensonian account of disagreement: 
If I am minded to permit smoking in our house, and my wife is minded to 
forbid it, we do disagree. Only one of these practical attitudes can be 
implemented, and I am for one, and she is for the other. (Blackburn 1998: 69) 
Entering the moral domain, suppose David and Ed are discussing taking military 
action in Syria. David says it is right that the UK should do so. Ed says it is wrong. On 
this view, David and Ed are experiencing a clash of attitudes. David is for military 
action in Syria; Ed is against it. Without a change of heart, one of them is going to be 
unsatisfied with the way the world goes. 
Nevertheless, it is implausible to think that all desires with incompatible 
contents are disagreements. Consider two badminton opponents who both 
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win the game. Mere wishings are not full-fledged judgments, but we can stipulate that 
the desire-like state is stronger than a fleeting fancy. Suppose each player has an all-
things-considered desire and a plan to win. Both plans cannot succeed; both players 
cannot be satisfied. It would be odd to label this as a disagreement. In a sense, they 
both agree Ȯ they agree that winning is valuable, that it is to be aimed at and strived 
for, that it is to be achieved. 
Stevenson seemed aware, at least implicitly, of the problem that mutually 
incompatible desires are insufficient for disagreement. He sometimes added the extra 
condition that people only disagree when ȁat least one of them has a motive for 
altering or calling into question the attitude of the otherȂȱ ǻȱŗşŚŚǱȱ řǼǯ This 
move has parallels with the theory we propose in §5. We believe people with 
divergent attitudes only disagree when at least one of them has a reason for altering or 
calling into question their own attitude (in light of their common project). But 
Ȃȱ  ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ  ȱ ȱ
ȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱ
judges she herself ought to smoke while Catherine thinks Annie really ought to quit, 
they disagree even if Catherine rather dastardly wishes Annie to retain her poor 
judgment. 
Ȃȱ ¢ȱȱȱ ȱǰȱ ǰȱȱȱ
ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȃȄȱ ǰȱ ȱ  ¢ȱ lasses badminton 
opponents as in disagreement with one another, and with it, it rules out the possibility 
that people can be indifferent or quite happy to remain in disagreement. It fails match. 
 
3. Disagreement in Plan 
Gibbard believes normative judgments are planning states. To think one ought to turn 
left at the junction, all things considered, is to plan to turn left if one finds oneself at 
ȱ ǯȱ 	Ȃȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
terms of these planning states. A first pass at defining normative disagreement is as 
follows: A and B disagree in plan if and only if A plans to “w in circumstances C, B 
plans to “?ȱȱǰȱȱ“wȱand “?ȱȱ (Gibbard 2003: 68-71). This overcomes 
the worry about the badminton players because, were one player to find herself in the 
circumstances of her opponent on the other side of the court, she too would plan to 
win. Both players agree that winning is the thing to (try to) do in either circumstance.  
But it may seem as though Gibbard will suffer from an inverted case of the 
badminton match. Suppose you now play a game against one of the original players, 
ȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȂȱ ȱȱ ǯȱȂȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ  
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actually prefer your opponent to win. You and your opponent seemingly have 
incompatible contingency plans for your situation Ȯ she plans to win if she were in 
your shoes, and you plan to lose in those exact circumstances. To classify you and 
your opponent as disagreeing with one another in virtue of planning different actions 
would be just as odd. 
The debate here gets complicated. Gibbard will insist that in this last example 
you and your opponent are not planning for the same circumstances because you have 
ȱǯȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȂȱȱand ȱǰȱ¢Ȃȱȱȱ ǰȱ
ȱ ¢ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ  ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȂȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱ
anyone could plan to do anything different than what anyone else plans. Gibbard 
ȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ
circumstances. We doubt there is a method for deciding which mental states should 
be included in the specification. We do not however take this objection to be 
conclusive.  
A much deeper ȱ ȱ	Ȃȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
divergent plans simply do not count as disagreement. Suppose pro-life Linda plans to 
never have an abortion whereas pro-ȱȱȂȱȱȱǯ Both could carry 
out their plans unhindered by the other, so in what sense are they incompatible? As 
Gibbard acknowledges, this seems ȱȱȱȱȱȱȁa difference of 
personal characteristics, likȱȱȱȱȂȱ ǻ	ȱŘŖŖřǱȱŘŝŖǼǯ Why 
ȱ ȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱ¢ȱȂȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱǵ 
	Ȃȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȁȱ ȱ
ȱȂȱǻ	d 2003: 70). We are social creatures. Much of our success as a 
species is owed to our incredible facility for communication, and this facility has 
allowed us to let others do our thinking from time to time. Chess players share tactics 
and strategy without ȱȱǻ ¢ǼȱȱȱȱȂȱǯȱȱȱ
ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȃȄȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ ȱȱȱ
players in a much more complicated game Ȯ the game of living. And it is more 
complex for two reasons. First, there are more contingencies to plan for. Second, the 
aim of the game is not declared by fiat. 
In thinking how to live we share our life strategies with one another, we learn 
from our community and we get better at living well. But there is a worry that this 
runs the risk of reducing our normative differences to non-normative ones. When we 
share a goal with our neighbour but disagree on the best means to achieve it, it seems 
ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȂ clear 
enough why we share thoughts about those. We want the truth, and our neighbours 
are often just as good as or better than we are at finding it. The deeper question is why 
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 ȱȱȱȱȂȱdivergent-at-the-roots attitude as a disagreement about 
how to live when, ultimately, we have different goals in mind. 
ȱǰȱ	Ȃȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ treating conflicting plans as 
disagreements. We presume he means to treat these conflicts as we would treat 
disagreements in belief, perhaps by losing some confidence in them. It certainly is true 
that in most cases we benefit from doubting our plans whenever we learn that 
someone, whose planning we admire, has made different plans for the same 
circumstances. If  Ȃ planning to take the high road and then notice our esteemed 
friend is confidently taking the low road, we would ask ourselves ȃȱȱȱ
know that we ȂǵȄȱWe would question our plan just like we would question one of 
our beliefs if somebody, whom we take to be a good authority on the matter, disagreed 
with us.  
But notice the qualification that we respect the judgment of the person we 
purportedly disagree with. (And this may include thinking her goals are broadly in 
line with our own.) If we find out upon closer inspection that the person taking the 
low road is not our esteemed friend but Amy the amoralist who always makes 
abhorrent decisions, we would not question our plan. And Amy, who holds our past 
decisions in low regard, would not question her plan upon learning about ours. 
Neither she nor we would see any benefit whatsoever in treating our respective plans 
as disagreements. She can take the low road if she wants;  Ȃ sticking with the high 
road. 
Although he takes pains to stress just how often there is a point to respecting 
the views of people whose plans diverge from our own, Gibbard acknowledges the 
¢ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȂȱȱȱ ǯȱȱ
these situationǰȱ ȱȱȱȱǯȱǰȱȁwith such an impasse, with no ways 
left to work toward accord, we could find no point to treating questions of how to live 
as topics ȱȱȱȂȱǻ	ȱŘŖŖřǱȱŘŞřǼǯ We find this far too 
big a bullet to bite. Whether at an impasse or not, we often think that Linda and Isha 
disagree about the permissibility of abortion, and this is true no matter how closed 
minded they are. Indeed, their disagreement may appear deeper as they become more 
entrenched in their own views. The fact that Gibbard renders this as no disagreement 
at all is a strong reason not to adopt his account.4     
 
 
                                                          
4 See also the discussion in section 5.2 and footnote 16. 
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4. Disagreement in Prescription 
Ridge rejects Stevensonian and Gibbardian accounts of disagreement in favour of 
basing disagreement in advice. Suppose Kantian Ant thinks a particular killing is 
wrong whereas Millian Bill judges it to be right. Ridge proposes that we should ask 
what advice parties would give about how to act in particular circumstances, on the 
assumption that the advice is given in certain idealized conditions. Since Ant would 
advise Sue the stabber to not perform the killing whereas Bill would give the opposite 
advice, Ant and Bill disagree. The idealization involves all parties answering in 
honesty, full candour and non-hypocrisy. Here is Ridge: 
Two people (or two stages of the same person at different times), A and B, 
ȱȱȱȱȂȱ“w -ing in C just in case in circumstances of 
honesty, full candour, and non-hypocrisy, A would advise F-ing in C and B 
would advise “?ing in C, where “w -ing and “?ing are incompatible, in the sense 
ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȂȱ¢ȱȱǯ5 (Ridge 
2013: 60) 
Ridge holds that normative disagreement consists in it being ȁimpossible to follow 
both pieces of adviceȂȱǻȱŘŖŗřǱȱŜŗǼǯ One problem with this account is that people 
may not give advice in accordance with their moral judgments.6 Suppose Bill, who 
thinks it right for Sue to perform the killing, judges that advising killing would diminish 
utility and that advising not-killing would maximise utility. Perhaps he thinks that 
society will see him as a monster if he advises killing, for instance, or perhaps he thinks 
Sue will do the opposite of what he advises. Even Ant may not advise Sue not to 
murder. As a Kantian, perhaps Ant sees more value in letting Sue come to the decision 
¢ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȂȱǯȱȱǰȱȱȱ
quite common for people to think it wrong to advise an action in certain 
circumstances, even if the advice is to do what they judge to be right. 
Ridge may respond that these are cases of dishonesty or lack of candour. Bill 
(with good reason) is not being honest when he fails to advise Sue to commit the 
murder and Ant is not being fully candid when he fails to advise her not to murder. 
You might wonder what honesty and candour amount to. Although one cannot make 
ȱȱȃ¢Ȅ when it comes to prescriptions due to their not being truth-apt, one 
                                                          
5 Ridge adds the final clause about becoming irrational in order to account for disagreement in belief. 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱbelieving that p ȱǯȱȱȂȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ
A would advise D to believe p, B would advise D to believe not p, and while it may be possible for D to 
follow both pieces of advice and believe both p and not p, D cannot do so without thereby being 
irrational. In this way, Ridge satisfies our desideratum of unity. 
6 Eriksson (2015) has a similar worry about advice diverging from judgment, although his worry is 
ȱȱȂ particular theory of the (hybrid) mental states that constitute normative judgments.  
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may talk of sincerity. Let us stipulate that advice is sincere (both honest and candid) 
if and only if the speaker advises what they want their audience to do.  
¢ǰȱ ȱȱ ȱȂȱȱǯȱ¢ȱ¢ǰȱ
Ant wants Sue to not murder of her own accord. It seems that the only kind of advice 
Ant can sincerely give Sue is to tell her to think through the issue more carefully. Ridge 
¢ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ ȃnon-hypocrisyȄ at this point, but this is troubling for a 
different reason. If being non-¢ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱ¡¢ȱ
what the speaker would do in that situation, then it seems as though the account 
ȱȱ	Ȃǯ For sȱȱ¢ȱȃȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǻȱ
sincerity) serum and asked him a strȱ ǯȄȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ǳȱ  ȱ
ȱȱ ȱȱǵȱȱȱȱȃȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ
ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱǵȄȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȃǯȱȱ¢ȱ
 Ȃȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ the decision has to come from herǯȄȱ
Instead, Ridge seems to be asking what advice Ant would give if he had to give some 
specific advice, and if Sue had to follow it, and if nobody Ȯ not Sue, not the community, 
not even himself Ȯ would ever find out what advice he gave. This is starting to sound 
very much like asking Ant what he would make Sue do if he could control her like a 
puppet, which in turn sounds very much like a personal planning question: what 
would you ȱȱ¢ȱ ȱǵȱȱȂȱ ȱȂȱion of advice boils down to, 
ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ	Ȃȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǯ 
Ridge therefore faces a dilemma. He can leave us with a fairly loose 
understanding of what would be advised in the closest worlds where we give sincere 
advice to an agent, but this fails to satisfy match - ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ
not conflict, despite their disagreement on the moral status of her murdering. 
¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȃȱ
e¡¢ȱȱ ȱ ȱǯȄȱȱȱȱmatch, it suffers from the same problem 
Gibbard identified with his first pass: the mere fact that we would do different things 
in a given situation looks more like a difference than a disagreement. This is what 
ȱ	Ȃȱ¢ȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱȱtreat our 
normative differences as disagreements, which led to his failure to account for cases 
of impasse. Could Ridge give a different story? 
Ridge proposes that two people with diverging plans for the same 
circumstances disagree because if they were to give sincere and non-hypocritical 
advice to a person, the advice that each one of them would give in these circumstances 
could not be followed at the same time. But why is that supposed to make us think 
ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱǵȱ	Ȃȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱ
to have an interest in learning from each other about how to live their lives then their 
diverging plans would constitute disagreement, since at least one of them would have 
a reason to reconsider their plan given their respect for the other as a good planner. 
ȱ ȱ  ȱ 	Ȃȱ  ȱ  ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ¢ǯȱ ȱ
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circumstances of impasse people would rationally lose the desire to learn from each 
Ȃȱ ǯȱ Ȃȱ  ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
project. If two people share the project of sincerely advising a single person then they 
have reason to find a way to offer non-diverging advice. But there is nothing necessary 
about the project of giving advice to the same person. 
 
4.1 Where do things stand? 
ǰȱ	ȱȱȂȱȱȱ¢ȱpersistence, since according to all 
three it is possible that disagreement will persist beyond agreement on all non-
normative facts. Ȃ theory fails match. The extension of what the theory 
counts as disagreement does not match our intuitions. As Ridge points out 
Ȃȱ¢ȱȱunity too (Ridge 2013: 46). 	Ȃ account also fails unity 
and match. His theory is not applicable to disagreement in belief and he fails match 
when it comes to cases of impasse between those who fundamentally disagree. 
¢ǰȱȂȱ satisfies unity, but is then impaled on the horns of a 
dilemma. On the first horn he allows advice to diverge from judgment and he fails 
match. On the second horn he amends the theory so that the advisor must advise what 
he himself would do in the situation. This satisfies match but it leaves us with the same 
puzzle that Gibbard faced initially, namely that a mere difference in what someone 
would do does not constitute disagreement. 
 
5. A Normative Theory of Disagreement 
We have seen how previous theories of disagreement given by expressivists have 
failed to match our intuitions. Either they are too demanding and we can imagine 
cases of disagreement where the suggested necessary conditions are not satisfied, or 
they are too permissive, construing situations as disagreements when they appear not 
to be. The attempt to capture judgments of disagreement as descriptions of a relation 
between attitudes seems to be missing something crucial. 
Ȃs missing? GibbardȂs discussion of impasse gives us an important clue. 
In his attempt to convince the reader that cases of apparent impasse are cases of real 
disagreement, Gibbard aims to show that even in these cases each party has reason to 
take seriously the views of the other. He aims to show that, even in situations where 
the parties to the apparent conflict share no common fundamental values, they should 
see the clash in attitudes as undermining the justification for their own view. Gibbard 
is unsuccessful, but the attempt itself is revealing: he is implicitly relying on the idea 
that disagreement (at least if we have no independent reason to think the other party 
is uninformed, irrational, or otherwise epistemically inferior) gives us reasons to 
10 
 
reconsider our own judgments.7 The view is also familiar from realist discussions of 
normative disagreement and more generally from discussions of non-normative 
disagreement.8 The realist, however, has an easy explanation of why disagreement 
indicates that at least one person should change their mind: if parties make conflicting 
judgments, at least one person is incorrectly representing the world and therefore has 
reason to alter their view (with a proviso to be discussed shortly). 
On the other hand, expressivist accounts of disagreement fail because they 
ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ  ȱ
judgments in light of disagreement. The mere fact of a clash between non-cognitive 
attitudes cannot rationalize this normative pressure, as we argued in earlier sections 
of this paper. After all, on the expressivist view fundamental non-cognitive attitudes 
are not meant to respond to or ȁfitȂ with any normative facts and so disagreement 
cannot be an indication of a failure of fit.  
It is instructive to consider the realistȂs rationale for the demand to reconsider 
oneȂs normative judgments in cases of disagreement with epistemic peers. The 
Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ  ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ  for 
reconsideration of our own judgments is itself the manifestation of an implicit 
assumption Ȯ the proviso mentioned earlier. Realists implicitly assume that the 
disagreeing parties share a common project, namely, the common search for 
normative truths.9 It is only because the other party to the disagreement shares this 
goal, and is therefore guided by the same standards, that their view ought to be taken 
as a reason for adjusting oneȂs own.10  The idea of tying disagreement to a shared 
purpose is hinted at by ȱ ¢ǰȱ  ȱ ȱ ȱ ȁrelevant factor [for 
disagreement] is evidently the conversational ends of the speakersȂȱǻ¢ȱŘŖŗŚǱȱŗřŗǼ. 
Attitudes of one party, in domains in which there is no shared goal, regardless of what 
the relation between them is Ȯ regardless, for instance, of whether they can rationally 
coexist in the mind of a single agent Ȯ cannot put pressure on the other party to adjust 
their own.11 Thus judgments about disagreement include, even on the realist analysis, 
                                                          
7 We have considered here the argument Gibbard gives in Thinking How to Live (particularly 2003: 280-
283). He offers a different argument for the same conclusion in Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (1990: 180). 
See also Shemmer (2014) for a criticism of that argument. 
8 Folley (2001: chapter 4). 
9 The common project may not be optional: according to some authors aiming for truth is constitutive 
of beliefs (Velleman 2000: introduction). 
10 Imagine (if you can) a being whose ȃȄȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȮ humour, 
¢ǯȱȱȱȃȄȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǲȱ¢ȱȱǯȱȱȱ
that your attitudes do not line up gives neither of you a reason to alter them, and this is because you 
have different goals with different standards for success. 
11 Of course, we might have instrumental reasons to adjust our attitudes in light of those of others even 
when we do not share a common project, e.g. if we learn of a clash of attitudes and are afraid of being 
ȱȱ ȱȂȱȱȱ ǰȱȱȱȱere is on the claim that the divergence implies at least 
one of us has reason to change our attitude merely in light of our common project. 
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an implicit judgment about a shared project, and therefore about standards that ought 
to guide the disputing parties. This gives us the necessary anchor for our new account 
of disagreement.  
We propose that judgments of disagreement are in part normative judgments 
Ȯ normative judgments about the standards that govern the formation and retention 
of attitudes of the disputing parties and therefore about the reasons that apply to the 
disputing parties. Since on the expressivist analysis normative judgments are 
expressions of non-cognitive attitudes, judgments of disagreement are also best 
understood as, in part, expressions of non-cognitive attitudes held by the person who 
makes the judgment that certain parties disagree.  
The view suggested here departs in this respect from all former expressivist 
analyses of disagreement. On all former expressivist analyses of disagreement, 
judgments that people are in disagreement are descriptive judgments. They describe a 
certain relation between the non-cognitive attitudes of the disputing parties. This 
descriptivist approach is at the heart of the failure of expressivist accounts of 
judgments of disagreement. As we have seen, no set of purely non-normative 
conditions in the offing has been necessary and sufficient for disagreement. 
Expressivists must stop seeing judgments of disagreement as purely descriptive and 
recognize their normative component.  
We aim to offer a unified analysis of disagreement which will cover 
disagreement in normative and descriptive judgments, and possibly even 
disagreement in attitudes other than the ones that play a role in descriptive and 
normative judgments.  
 
A and B disagree if and only if: 
1. A has attitude a, B has attitude b, and a and b are different. 
2. A and B share a common project with certain standards for the 
formation and retention of attitudes.12 
3. Given the standards imposed by their common project, the 
divergence of a and b implies that at least one of A and B has reason 
to change their attitude.13 
 
To illustrate, suppose Alice and Bob are about to paint a fence. Alice plans to paint it 
green all over but Bob plans to paint it blue. Due to this divergence in attitude 
combined with their common project of painting the fence, there is reason for either 
ȱȱȱǻȱǼȱȱȱǯȱȱ¢ȱȂǰȱ¢ȱ Ȃȱȱ¢ȱǯȱȱȱ
not to say that either Alice or Bob has most reason to change plan. Perhaps they are 
                                                          
12 This may or may not be a normative judgment. We take no stand on this issue. 
13 The analysis can be naturally extended beyond two parties judged to be in disagreement.  
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both being paid to paint the fence their respective colours, or threatened if they fail to 
do so. However, these are extraneous considerations. The conditions are met, so Alice 
and Bob disagree Ȯ they disagree about what colour to paint the fence. 
 
5.1 Clarifications 
Cognitivists might also adopt our analysis, but for now we focus on the advantages it 
offers expressivist. Due to the normative component in our analysis, and given the 
expressivist understanding of normative judgments, an expressivist who adopts it 
will maintain that there are no robust facts about whether two people disagree. 
Judgments of disagreement, she will claim, are in part expressions of desire-like 
attitudes. 
One might have the intuition that even if expressivism is true there must be 
robust facts about disagreement. For instance, if Geoff thinks grass is green and Jingbo 
thinks grass is green, it is a robust fact that they do not disagree.14 However, at least 
ȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ	ȱȱȱȂȱ
ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱ
ȱȱȂȱǯȱȱǛŗȱȱa simple description, and one that is robustly not 
met by Geoff and Jingbo. Because disagreement contains both descriptive and 
normative components Ȯ disagreement is thick Ȯ there can indeed be robust facts about 
when there is no disagreement. On the other hand, in cases where the descriptive 
conditions are met, our theory does imply that expressivists are committed to there 
ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȂȱǯ 
Our analysis is not tied to any particular expressivist account of normative 
judgment (or any account of normative judgment at all). If our analysis of 
disagreement is correct and if expressivists are right about normative judgments then 
judgments of disagreements involve the expression of some desire-like state. We 
remain neutral on exactly what state that will be.  
The reason mentioned in condition #3 must be grounded in the project A and 
B are undertaking, and given this project, the existence of the reason must be implied 
by the difference in their attitudes. An example will help. Suppose A believes London 
is the capital of Kenya and B believes Paris is the capital of Spain. They have a common 
project of finding the truth, and at least one of them (in fact both) has pro tanto reason 
ȱȱȱȱ ǻȱ Ȃ false). But the reasons they have to change their 
attitudes are not implied by the difference between them, so this does not count as a 
disagreement. On the other hand, if B believes London is not the capital of Kenya, this 
implies that either A or B has a false belief and so at least one of them has reason to 
change their mind Ȯ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ¢Ȃȱǯȱ 
                                                          
14 Thanks to Paul Faulkner for this point.  
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ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȂȱ ȱwhich of A and B has reason 
to change their attitude. Furthermore, A and B need not think of themselves as in 
disagreement to actually be in disagreement. They may not even know about each 
Ȃȱ¡ǯȱȱȱ¡ȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
given in terms of reasons and not rationality, since disagreement is possible between 
parties who are not aware of each other and who have no access to the reasons they 
might have to change their mind. Reasons are to be understood objectively here. All 
Ȃȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱȂȱ ȱ  p ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱȱ
ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ p so neither of them has subjective reason to think 
otherwise. One might object that our analysis of disagreement entails an over-
intellectualized understanding of judgments of disagreement. That is not so. To judge 
that people disagree need not involve any explicit judgments that our three conditions 
hold. The three component parts could be tacit judgments, and often the second and 
ȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȃȄȱȱȮ that is, the agent need not process them even 
sub-agentially, unless some defeaters make her doubt that the parties share a project 
or that the standards set by the project require alignment of attitude.15 
Finally, what is a common project? The question has two parts. What is a 
project? And what is a common projeǵȱȱȁȂȱȱȱ ȱfor a plan or a 
goal. There are multiple answers in the literature to the question what it is to have a 
goal. Davidson would have identified Ȃȱȱ ȱ ȱȱjects of 
Ȃȱǯȱȱȱ¢ȱȂȱȱ ȱȱropositional objects of 
the desires one would have were one consistent, whereas for others oȂȱȱȱ
identified with the propositional objects of those of Ȃȱȱȱȱndorsed by 
second-order desires (Frankfurt 1969) or coherent second order self-governing 
policies (Bratman 2000). Furthermore, some projects may not be optional. Perhaps our 
beliefs always aim at truth no matter what. Perhaps the project of living together 
ethically is non-optional, and so we are always bound by the standards of morality 
regardless of our particular desires. We stay neutral on the question of what 
ȱȂ projects. A common project is a project that two or more people have 
in common. This does not imply the agents are acting jointly, but merely that they are 
bound by the same standards. We are neutral on the question of what these standards 
are and whether they are normatively determined, constitutively determined, or 
something else. 
 
5.2 The advantages of a normative theory of disagreement 
Our analysis satisfies the three main desiderata of a theory of disagreement: unity, 
persistence and match. Let us first see how our theory allows us to give a unified account 
                                                          
15 Thanks to Joseph Raz and Alex Duval for pushing us to clarify this point, and thanks to Luca 
Barlassina for the suggestion to appeal to default judgments. 
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of normative and descriptive disagreement. On our view, both normative and 
descriptive disagreement is partly constituted by normative truths. When A and B 
descriptively disagree, they have different attitudes (beliefs), they are engaged in a 
common project (the project of finding out the truth), and given the standards 
governing this project, their differing attitudes imply at least one of them has a reason 
to change it (because it implies at least one of their beliefs is false). As the same analysis 
works for normative disagreement, our account is unified.  
Furthermore, it has the capacity to extend to other attitudes. Someone may 
sincerely consider two idealists who differ in their hopes to be in disagreement, for 
instance. If we think she is wrong, our disagreement with her may be normative Ȯ we 
may think the standards governing appropriate formation and retention of hopes do 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱ ȱȂȱǰȱȱȱ¡ȱ
what unifies the states of mind that are apt for disagreement: they are those we may 
have reason to alter in light of divergence and a common project. 
The account also satisfies the desideratum of persistence for disagreement in the 
normative domain if expressivism is true. Two instrumentally rational people may 
disagree about normative matters, despite their agreement on all non-normative facts. 
This is because, first of all, they may have different desire-like attitudes despite having 
all the same representational beliefs. Secondly, this difference under a common project 
may imply at least one of them has reason to change their attitude. This is, of course, 
a normative judgment, and one that others may dispute. The debate between reasons 
internalists and reasons externalists may strongly bear upon our intuitions about 
normative disagreement. 
Indeed it is an advantage of our account that it predicts that if parties in a 
purported normative dispute believe the normative domain is a domain of robust 
facts, then they will themselves view the disagreement as implying a reason for at 
least one of them to reconsider their attitude; whereas if they do not see the normative 
domain as a domain of facts, they may, but need not, think of their differing attitudes 
as providing neither of them with a reason to reconsider their attitudes. Of course a 
third party might at the same time think that it does imply such a reason.16 On our 
view, the battle between those who view divergence in conative states as potential 
disagreements and those who do not is to be fought on normative terrain. 
Lastly, our account satisfies matchǯȱȱȂȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ
disagreement was a matter of parties having beliefs, or desires, with inconsistent 
contents. This counter-intuitively classed badminton opponents as in disagreement, 
since both of their desires to win could not be satisfied. Our account explains why 
                                                          
16 An instance of this can be seen in the debate about whether cases of fundamental impasse imply at 
least one person has reason to change their view. While we are tempted to agree with Ridge (2013: 53-
54) that it does, Gibbard (2003: 283) thinks it does not. 
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badminton opponents do not disagree Ȯ they have no reason to alter their desires for 
victory in light of their common project of playing badminton. Badminton is a case of 
ȱȃȄȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱǻȱȱȱ
of dining togetheǼȱ ȱȱȃȄȱǯ ȱȱȱ ȱȂȱ¡ȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱȂȱǰȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ
and B disagree even when neither A nor B desires the other to change their attitude. 
As opposed to Ridge the account allows us to divorce disagreement from advice. A 
and B can disagree in their diverging attitudes even while giving the same advice, or 
agree while giving differing advice. Finally, as we have seen in our discussion of 
persistence in the previous paragraph, our account allows us to claim, as opposed to 
Gibbard, that in circumstances of impasse a third party may judge that at least one of 
the two disputing parties has reason to reconsider their attitudes, even if the disputing 
parties themselves see their case as one of mere difference and therefore as one in 
which neither party has reason to reconsider their attitudes. 
 
6. Objections and Replies 
In this section we respond to four potential objections to our normative theory of 
disagreement. 
 
6.1 Unreasonable projects 
A and B are both white supremacists and have different views about the best way to 
promote their ideology. However, their ideology is misguided and is not a source of 
reasons. White supremacy gives A and B no reasons whatsoever, and therefore no 
reason to change their minds given the difference in their views in light of this project. 
It seems that our view thus entails that A and B are not in disagreement. But clearly, 
says the objector, they do disagree. 
An initial reply is that A and B disagree in belief since their different views give 
at least one of them a reason to reconsider given their common project of finding the 
most efficient way to promote white supremacy. Of course the disagreement may be 
expressed in terms of what to do, but their judgments about what to do rest on 
different beliefs (about how best to achieve their goals). The disagreement about what 
to do is derivative Ȯ A and B have no disagreement about fundamental normative 
judgments. 
To get to the heart of the matter the objector may specify the case as follows: A 
and B are both white supremacists but disagree about whether it is best - not 
instrumentally but rather morally - to first exterminate race R1 or to first exterminate 
race R2. Since their racism is misguided the standards of their racist project give A and 
B no reasons whatsoever and therefore no reasons to change their minds, given the 
difference between their views in light of this unreasonable project. So, the objector 
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will argue, according to our analysis A and B do not disagree. But it certainly looks 
like they disagree. 
If the divergence between the views of A and B is not the result of a 
disagreement about how best to bring about a certain result, namely the 
disappearance of all non-white races, then the difference in their position is a 
difference in fundamental norms. A supports white supremacy of type i and B of type 
ii. Given this understanding, the project they share is the general moral project and 
they have different views about what fundamental principles should guide this 
project. As long as there are general moral standards that apply to A and B and since 
given these standards the difference in views of A and B is an indication that at least 
one of them has reason to reconsider their position, our analysis entails that they do 
disagree. One way to believe that the difference in views of A and B is an indication 
that at least one of them has a reason to change her view is to think morality is about 
getting to the moral truth, and so one of the divergent views must be incorrect and 
thus ought to be altered to represent reality. A different way is to think morality just 
is the business of aligning goals and finding ways to live together, and so a divergence 
in moral opinion implies at least one person should change in order to live in 
harmony.  
What if A and B share the project of morality but it turns out there are no moral 
standards; that the project of morality is pointless and therefore not a source of 
reasons? The objector may claim that in this case our analysis entails that A and B are 
not in disagreement even though they still seem to be in disagreement. In response, 
we would reply that even if the project of morality is pointless that does not mean that 
there are no common standards imposed on A and B. As long as A and B have both 
committed to a common plan (the plan, say, of finding ways of living together) these 
commitments may impose standards on them which, given their diverging views, 
imply at least one of them has reason to change his view.17  
The objector could however insist that we consider a world in which no 
standards of any sort apply to A and B in light of which, given their diverging views, 
they have reason to reconsider. In that case there are no reasons that apply to A and 
B, neither reasons of morality nor reasons of any other sort, and therefore no reason 
not to diverge in attitudes. The objector could then argue that while, given our 
analysis, A and B do not disagree, intuitions still suggest they do. 
                                                          
17 It may be the case that standards of rationality apply to them in light of which their difference in 
attitudes indicates that at least one of them has reasons to reconsider. In other words we might think 
that just as in the intrapersonal case a plan imposes on a person standards of consistency, so in the 
interpersonal case a common plan imposes standards of interpersonal consistency. To illustrate, even if 
there is no good reason to decide to paint the garden fence, you might think that if two people decide 
to paint it, they had better align their opinions on what colour paint to use. 
17 
 
ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǯȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ
reason whatsoever to cohere in attitudes our intuition that A and B disagree vanishes. 
In such a world the difference in attitudes of A and B will seem like the difference of 
attitudes of people who like different flavours of ice cream and who insist they face 
disagreement.  
So far our objector stipulated situations in which parties do or do not have 
reason to change attitudes. But expressivists deny that there are robust facts about 
practical reasons. On their view claims about practical reasons are expressions of non-
cognitive mental states that might vary from one person to another. An expressivist 
who adopts our analysis of disagreement will predict that judgments of disagreement 
 ȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȂȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱ¡ȱ ¢ȱȱ
are conflicting opinions about whether people with conflicting judgments who are at 
an irresolvable impasse are really in disagreement. 
ȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȁȂȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
ȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȁȂȱȱ
refer to disputes that are referred to by a local community as cases of disagreement. 
The foreign visitor may adopt this terminology in order to simplify communication 
 ȱȱȱ¢ǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȁȂȱȱȱȱ
ȁȱ ȱ¢ȱ ȱ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃǯȱ
¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȁȂȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
would be disagreement if the values held in common by the disputing parties were, 
counter to the fact, reason-giving. ȱȱȱȁȂȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ȁȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ
values accepted by the disputing parties were in fact reason-Ȃǯȱȱȱ
usages should not confuse our understanding of what disagreement is. 
Finally, the objector might contend that while an expressivist had better 
concede that if no norms apply to A and B we would lose the intuition that A and B 
disagree, that concession does not support an expressivist account of disagreement 
over non-expressivist accounts. About that we agree with the objector. Our task here 
is limited. We want to show that our account is a good expressivist account of 
disagreement and an interesting candidate for a general account of disagreement. We 
do not intend to show that it is superior to all non-expressivist accounts. 
 
6.2 Conciliating steadfast epistemologists 
Sam believes the train is due at five past. Isela, her epistemic peer, believes it is due at 
ten past. Neither of them has any special reason to think one is in a better position 
than the other with regards to the truth. In the face of peer disagreement such as this, 
epistemologists may think it is rational either to be conciliatory or to remain steadfast. 
Conciliatory views (Elga 2007, Feldman 2007) propose that it is rational for Sam to 
18 
 
lower her confidence upon learning that Isela disagrees. Steadfast views (Rosen 2001, 
Kelly 2005) hold it to be rational for Sam to stick to her guns and retain the strength of 
her belief. On the face of it, it seems as though steadfast views threaten our theory. If 
neither Sam nor Isela has a reason to reconsider their beliefs in light of their divergence 
and their common project of finding the truth, our theory classifies them as not in 
disagreement. But they are. This would mean we fail to satisfy match.  
 Discussion of conciliatory and steadfast views is normally couched in terms of 
what it is rational to believe rather than what we have reason to believe. Our answer 
therefore involves a characterisation of steadfastness that we hope is plausible to its 
defenders. When translated into the language of reasons, we believe the steadfast view 
is best characterised as the vi ȱȱ ȱ ǻǼȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȂȱȱ
conflicts with your own is not a reason to alter your credence. This is compatible with 
our view. We are only committed to the conflict implying that at least one party has a 
reason to change their mind Ȯ not that the conflict is the reason. 
If the steadfast view is true, what reason is there for either Sam or Isela to 
change their mind? Reality. If the train is not in fact due at five past, Sam has an 
objective reason to alter her belief to reflect reality. If the train is not due at ten past, 
Isela has reason to change her mind. The train is either not due at five past or not due 
at ten past, therefore at least one of the two parties has a reason to change their view. 
 Descriptive disagreements come cheaply, then, but this is no objection to our 
theory. There is very little controversy about when two people disagree in their beliefs. 
Our theory unifies disagreement in belief with disagreement in other attitudes and it 
also explains why it is easy to tell when two people with conflicting beliefs disagree Ȯ 
ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱȁȂȱȱȱǰ18 and so if two 
beliefs conflict, at least one of them does not match reality. This implies at least one 
person has reason to change their mind, assuming the project of finding the truth is 
reason-giving. 
 When it comes to non-representational states, the mere existence of any 
disagreements at all is controversial. This, we believe, is evidence in favour of our 
theory. The controversy boils down to whether there is reason to align our non-
cognitive attitudes such as plans and desires when there is no robust reality we are 
aiming to represent. This was why Stevenson sometimes claimed that parties must 
 ȱȱȱȱȂȱ if they are to be classed as in disagreement, and why 
Gibbard spends a sizeable portion of his book arguing that we have reason to treat 
ȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
common projects that require alignment of conative attitudes.  
To summarise, in cases of disagreement the reason to change at least one 
attitude is implied by the diverging attitudes in light of a common project, but the 
                                                          
18 Of course, if we think truth is relative, our intuitions about disagreement get murkier, and rightly so. 
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reason need not be the fact that the attitudes diverge. This move allows us to make 
room for steadfast views in social epistemology. 
 
6.3 Levels of specificity 
Suppose A believes murderers should be punished but suspends judgment about 
how. B believes murderers should be executed. A and B have different attitudes, and 
it is plausible that they share a common project Ȯ perhaps the project of determining 
just punishment, or the general moral project of finding rules and regulations to live 
by. Some may have the intuition that the divergence implies that at least one of the 
two ȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȂȱȱǯȱȱ
might be natural, then, to think our three conditions are met. However, intuitively A 
ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǯ 
 There are two different ways to interpret this objection. On the first our 
conditions are not met, whereas on the second it begins to look like A and B do actually 
ǯȱȱȱȱǰȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
is perfectly compatiblȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ǯȱȱ ǰȱ
execution is a form of punishment. Therefore our third condition is not met Ȯ the mere 
fact that A and B have these (admittedly different) attitudes does not imply one of 
them has reason to drop it. A could retain ȱȱ ȱȱȱȂǯȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱȂǯȱ 
ȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ
¢ǯȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȂȱȱȱ specifics yet, but that A rejects 
forming a judgment, perhaps on the basis that the available evidence is insufficient to 
 ȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȂȱȱ
Ȯ that of thinking murderers should be punished while rejecting further specificity Ȯ 
ȱ ȱȂȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ
imply that either A herself or B has reason to change their mind. Our three conditions 
are met. Yet the case has now been described in a way that makes it intuitive to think 
of it as a case of disagreement: A and B disagree about what the available evidence 
warrants. 
 
6.4 Judgments of disagreement 
We have presented a theory of disagreement and claimed that expressivists would do 
best to adopt this theory. Since the theory consists in part of a normative condition, an 
expressivist who accepts it will subsume the analysis of disagreement under her 
general account of normativity. She will thus, at least in the first instance, speak not of 
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disagreement itself but rather of judgments of disagreement,19 and will understand 
these judgments as consisting in part in the expression of non-cognitive attitudes. The 
current objection targets the resulting account of judgments of disagreement.  
 Consider the following scenario: a judge J believes that A is for giving money 
to charity and B is for lowering taxes, and therefore that their attitudes a and b are 
different.  J also judges that A and B share a common project of morality and that (for 
some reason) given the standards imposed by their common project, the divergence 
of a and b implies that at least one of A and B has reason to change their attitudes. An 
expressivist who accepts our analysis of disagreement, says the objection, is bound to 
claim that in this situation, J would judge that A and B disagree. But this does not seem 
right.  
ȱȂȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ
money to charity is not incompatible with lowering taxes, and second in the 
¢ȱȱ£ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱǯȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȂȱ ȱȱȱȱ
changing attitudes is clarified the objection dissipates. If for example J believes that 
the project of morality requires people to have similar attitudes to money and further 
believes that lowering taxes is bound to make people greedy and to prevent them from 
giving to charity, then it seems plausible that J would judge that A and B disagree. If 
on the other hand J is described as a person whose judgment about reasons is utterly 
unintelligible, then we are unlikely to share his judgment of disagreement and are also 
incapable of having reliable intuitions about whether or not he would judge 
disagreement. 
Additionally, as we mentioned in section 5.1, an expressivist who accepts our 
analysis of disagreement and who incorporates such analysis into her general account 
of judging reasons, is not thereby providing an account of the mechanisms that 
ground judgments of disagreements. She is not committed to the claim that people 
explicitly or implicitly apply our three conditions when judging disagreement. Our 
expressivist is merely committed to the claim that instances of disagreement are best 
understood in terms of our analysis; an analysis that, for all we have said, is opaque 
to the person who judges disagreement. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Stevenson, Gibbard and Ridge each fail some of the desiderata for a theory of 
normative disagreement. Gibbard and RȂȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱ
match both theories include an implicit appeal to a project common to the disagreeing 
                                                          
19 To examine the judgment rather than the metaphysics of the thing itself is what Dreier (2015: 273) 
ȱȃȱ¡ȱȄȱȱ ȱȱ Chrisman (2012: 324Ǽȱȱȃȱȱ¡ȱ
ǯȄ 
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parties. However, both projects are contingent, and the realization that this is so 
reveals a lacuna in both views: neither can explain why in the absence of either 
common project diverging conative attitudes constitute disagreement and not 
difference. 
We suggest a theory of disagreement which is in particular a normative theory 
of disagreement. On our view the judgment that people disagree is itself a normative 
judgment, in part to the effect that at least one of the disagreeing parties has reason to 
change her attitude in light of their diverging attitudes and the common standards 
imposed on her by their common project. Our account meets all three desiderata for a 
theory of normative disagreement. Seeing judgments of disagreement as normative 
judgments also allows us to explain the key connection between the common project 
that disagreeing parties are engaged in and the normative pressure to which they are 
subject to adjust their attitudes in light of their disagreement. Furthermore, it allows 
us to provide this explanation without assuming that the disagreeing parties will 
always consider themselves bound by a common project. 
We offer this theory primarily as a substitute to existing expressivist theories 
of disagreement, but it could equally be adopted by cognitivists. In future work we 
aim to show that it is of particular interest to subjectivists, since it would allow them 
to meet persistence without giving up the cognitivist nature of their position. 
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